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The long-running conflict in northern Uganda has led to major violations of human 
rights against civilians, destruction of infrastructure, reduced access to social services, 
and paralysed economic activity. Creating peace and fostering reconciliation in the 
region have not been successful either, thereby hindering development and relief 
activities, which are further constrained by insufficient funding, and lack of capacity at 
the district and community levels. The main challenges for reconstruction in northern 
Uganda are therefore to: (i) achieve peace and reconciliation (ii) provide basic social 
services to the affected areas (iii) strengthen government capacity to coordinate 
development and relief activities and (iv) harmonize interventions by the various 
stakeholders to achieve increased flexibility and transparency. 
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Northern Uganda has long been plagued by violent conflict and insecurity. The brutal 
and relentless war between Uganda government forces and the rebel group, the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), has lasted nearly 19 years. Karamojong pastoralists and 
tribesmen have also raided and terrorized neighbouring districts in the northern and 
eastern parts of Uganda for over four decades. The results have been gross violations of 
human rights, especially those of women and children, destruction of infrastructure, 
paralysis in economic activity, and a general social and cultural breakdown. As a result 
the northern region remains the poorest area of Uganda with an estimated 63 per cent of 
the population living below the poverty line in 2003 (UBOS 2003b). With the failure to 
achieve peace impeding the restoration of service delivery, the region’s human 
development lags significantly behind the national average. 
This article discusses the effects of conflict on poverty and human development in 
northern Uganda. It consolidates results from the region’s reconstruction efforts to-date, 
and draws some lessons for ongoing and future operations in post-conflict areas. The 
paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a background to the conflicts in 
northern Uganda while section 3 discusses its effects on poverty and human 
development. Section 4 outlines the reconstruction efforts being carried out in northern 
Uganda, and identifies the pitfalls. Section 5 concludes and draws recommendations.  
2  Background to the conflicts in northern Uganda  
The northern part of Uganda comprises 13 districts located in five sub-regions 
(Figure 1).1 But the political boundaries encompass five other districts in Teso sub-
region, that have suffered under armed conflicts although they are statistically included 
in the eastern region (Katakwi, Kaberamaido, Soroti, Kumi, and Pallisa) (MFPED 
2004). Thus, northern Uganda is politically defined to include 18 districts, of which 
Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, Lira and Apac, Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit have been 
devastated the most by conflict. 
2.1  Background to conflicts in the Acholi and Lango sub-regions 
The current conflict in Acholi and Lango sub-regions between the LRA and the Uganda 
government has deep historic roots resulting from ethnic hostilities, colonial-era 
marginalization of the north, institutional weaknesses, troubled politics during the post-
independence period when military sectors of different ethnic groups aspired to regain 
power from a succession of Uganda governments, as well as from certain external 
factors.  
The main tribe in the northern region, known today as the Acholi, are a merger of the 
luo speaking Nilotes and Nilo-hamites. ‘When the British colonialists entered Acholi in 
the 18th century, they did not find any strong central administrative system in Acholi 
from which to start, unlike in Buganda and Bunyoro where there were centralized 
                                                 
1  The districts are Gulu, Kitgum and Pader in the Acholi sub-region; Apac and Lira in the Lango sub-
region; Moyo and Adjumani in the Madi sub-region; Arua, Yumbe and Nebbi in the West Nile   
sub-region; and Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit in the Karamoja sub-region. 2 
monarchies’ (PACMU 2002: 26). The British created socioeconomic divisions between 
the north and the Bantu-dominated south, by establishing in the south (Kampala and 
Jinja) more productive ventures such as agricultural plantations, industrial and 
commercial centres. The north and other regions of Uganda became economically 
marginalized, and the northerners, especially the Acholi, provided the plantation and 
industrial labour while southerners were preferred for white-collar jobs.  
Collier and Hoeffler (2001) argue that rebellion can typically be explained by severe 
grievances such as inequality, lack of political rights or ethnic and religious differences 
in society. These factors might partly explain why the division between the north and 
south caused friction between their populations, rather than between Ugandans as a 
whole and the colonialists. In addition, the development of the southern regions at the 
expense of the north led to an economic imbalance, and subsequently to higher rates of 
army recruitment among northerners as they attempted to improve their livelihoods. 
This imbalance persisted well into the post-colonial era; the Acholi dominated the army 





From the early post-independent period onwards no effort was put into making the army 
a national institution; it was used instead to promote the political survival of the 
governments in power. Collier and Reinikka (2001) argue that repression, particularly 
by using the military, for ‘solving’ political problems indicates that Uganda at 
independence lacked resilient democratic institutions. The army was not only biased in 
favour of northerners but also tribally skewed towards the Acholi, Langi and West 
Nilers.  
The first prime minister, Milton Obote, was overthrown by his army commander Idi 
Amin in 1971. During Amin’s regime (1971-79) Langi and Acholi soldiers, perceived to 
be Obote’s agents, were treated harshly. Amin was overthrown by rebel Ugandan 
soldiers and the invading Tanzanian army in 1979. Contested national elections brought 
Milton Obote back to power in 1980, only to be overthrown again in July 1985 by 
Acholi officers in the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) led by Tito Okello 
Lutwa. Meanwhile, Yoweri Museveni had started the National Resistance Army and 
Movement (NRA/M), which overthrew the UNLA government led by Tito Okello in 
January 1986. Okello’s military junta of Acholi dominated forces withdrew to their 
homelands in northern Uganda and later to Sudan where they formed the Uganda 
People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) to oppose the NRA. The NRA was renamed the 
Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) in 1995.  
Since taking power in 1986, the NRA has faced continuous opposition from armed rebel 
movements. In 1985, Alice Lakwena (Auma), an Acholi from northern Uganda, created 
the Holy Spirit Movement, but these forces were defeated in late 1986. When the UPDA 
finally called off hostilities in June 1988, the majority of these troops joined the 
government to fight other rebel groups. 
In April 1987, Joseph Kony started his own military movement by drawing support 
mostly from the Acholi UPDA deserters. His movement, first called the Lord’s 
Salvation Army and later the United Democratic Christian Force, became the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) in 1994. The LRA is said to have no political aims beyond 
opposing the National Resistance Movement government (NRM), but it is conducting a 
reign of terror mainly against the local Acholi in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, who are 
accused of being supporters of the government. This has effectively disrupted normal 
life, as the LRA is said to be the most brutal rebel group in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
It is rumoured that the LRA received military equipment, medicine and food from the 
Sudanese government particularly in the 1990s, which may partly explain why the 
northern insurgency has persisted. Sudan also offered the LRA a safe haven in return for 
assistance against the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) based in the south, 
and apparently as retaliation for Uganda’s support to the SPLA.  
2.2  Background to conflicts in the Karamoja sub-region 
Karamoja (consisting of Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit districts, Figure 1) is a semi-
arid region with scant rainfall, located in north-eastern Uganda, bordering on southern 
Sudan and northern Kenya. It has a population of some 921,000 people (UBOS 2003a) 
and is dominated by herdsmen: the Dodoth in the north, the Jie in the centre, and the 
Bokora, Matheniko and Pian in the south. The Tur speaking Labwor inhabit the west 
and a Kalenjin  speaking group, the Pokot, live in the southeast. Karamoja is 4 
marginalized and isolated—economically, socially, and culturally. It also has the worst 
socioeconomic indicators of wellbeing in Uganda. 
Karamoja has long been plagued by persistent insecurity, unrest and instability 
primarily because of the tradition of cattle raiding and the widespread availability of 
small arms amongst the herders of the region. Until the beginning of the 1960s, guns 
were not available to the Karamojong cattlekeepers, there was no cattle raiding, and 
hostilities, mainly over waterwells during the dry season, were traditionally fought with 
spears.  
This changed in the 1970s as the Turkana from the west and the Toposa of northern 
Kenya and Southern Sudan, armed with modern weapons, launched frequent cattle 
plundering trips into Karamoja. By the late 1960s the Karamojong began in self-defence 
to manufacture homemade guns. They also supplemented their stocks after Amin’s 
overthrow by looting an army armoury in Moroto in 1979, and with illegal trade in 
small arms across the Sudan-Kenya borders. Once armed, the Karamojong began to 
retaliate with cattle raids and terrorizing the Katakwi, Pader, Kitgum, Kumi and Lira 
districts, as well as neighbouring Kenya and Sudan, particularly when pasture in 
Karamoja became scarce. These raids have persisted despite attempts by successive 
governments to disarm the Karamojong and establish peace.  
Poverty and a harsh environment also perpetuate insecurity in Karamoja. Prolonged 
drought2 and shortages of food and water are facts of life in this region. During a 
prolonged dry spell, herdsmen leave permanent homesteads and move their animals to 
search for pastures, water and disease-free land, often crossing into neighbouring tribal 
territories or countries. This has induced a conflict-prone environment, as the struggle 
for the control of these natural resources escalates.  
Unemployment and inadequate economic opportunities also generate conflict and 
insecurity. Well armed with illegal guns, the only source of livelihood for the 15-35 
year old youth is cattle raids on other clans or tribes.  
3  Effects of conflicts on poverty and human development  
3.1  Displacement of people 
Continuous acts of violence by LRA rebels and Karamojong warriors have displaced 
more than 1.4 million people in northern Uganda, who now reside in camps mainly in 
the districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Lira (Table 1). More than 80 per cent of the 
population in Acholiland are displaced, consisting mainly of women and children. The 
level of displacement increased dramatically from July 2002 after a government order 
for all Acholi residents to move to protected camps or centres, in efforts to protect the 
civilian population from rebel attacks and abduction.  
                                                 
2   Short rains come during April and the longer rainy season extends from June to early September.  5 
Table 1 
Geographical distribution of IDPs in Uganda 
Districts Oct-98  Dec-99  Nov-00  Dec-01  Jul-02 Nov-03 Jan/Feb-04  March-05 
Adjumani   10,000 2,000    
Bundibujo 11,000  101,000 105,000 63,000 87,000   
Gulu* 261,206  237,710 370,000 292,160 368,417 419,258 438,000 515,309
Kibaale   12,000    
Kabarole Kenjojo    20,000 14,595 15,416 100 0   
Kapchorwa   5,000    
Kasese   35,000 16,000 18,000 200 0   
Katakwi *    15,000 88,500 77,000 104,254 160,000 
Kitgum *  122,121  93,000 82,645 82,645 133,000 281,372 223,883 269,809
Lira  *  13,000  79,097 283,709 299,283
Masindi   46,958 5,000    
Kaberamaido *    97,561  97,561 
Kotido *  67,000    3,000 
Kumi *    59,207  3,000 
Pader  *    17,000 229,115 229,859 279,589
Soroti *    136,112  109,441 
Total 474,327  560,668 610,240 559,721 682,717 1,405,976 1,548,453 1,363,990
 Acholi land   383,327  330,710 452,645 374,805 518,417 929,745 891,742  1,064,707
Notes:  Districts in northern Uganda are marked with *; 
  The number of IDPs (as of March 2005) can fluctuate according to the security situation. The 
number here reflects those receiving food from WFP and is not necessarily the total IDPs for the 
whole country. Night commuters are also excluded.  
Source:   Global IDP (2003), UNOCHA (2004), UNOCHA (2005). 
 
3.2  Security and abuse of internally displaced persons 
Although intended to protect civilians from rebel hostilities, internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) do not appear to be adequately protected in the camps, as these are attacked 
regularly by the LRA. Property has been destroyed or looted, homes burnt, people 
remaining behind in the villages killed, and vehicles ambushed. All this has increased 
vulnerability within the IDP camps and has added to the trauma and to the numbers of 
IDPs and ‘night commuters’, the children who flee at night to the safety of the cities. It 
has also restricted movement of people and caused inter-ethnic clashes among the Langi 
in Lira district and the Acholi,3 thus, posing a potential threat for further violence.  
The UPDF forces are also alleged to have inflicted on northern Ugandans inhumane 
cruelties of torture, rape and sexual assault, child recruitment, and instant execution 
during detention. The UPDF are rarely prosecuted for these crimes, and investigations 
of abuse are not made public, creating the appearance of impunity, with a subsequent 
loss of public trust. 
Intertribal clashes, armed robberies and ambushes on the roads by the Karamojong 
raiders have caused considerable anxiety in Karamoja and neighbouring districts, 
                                                 
3  The Langi and Acholi groups clashed following an LRA attack on a camp in Lira district, because the 
LRA is composed mainly of ethnic Acholi.  6 
particularly the bordering Katakwi, where more than 70 per cent of the population was 
displaced in February 2004 (Table 1). The raids can be very violent; killings, rape, theft 
of animals, and malicious destruction of property have occurred. 
3.3 Abductions 
The LRA has abducted over 40,000 civilians; it is estimated that at least 25,000 are 
children, the main target of the armed conflict (Human Rights Watch 2003; 
UNICEF  2004; Liu Institute for Global Studies 2003) to be exploited as front-line 
soldiers, forced labour or forced to carry out extreme forms of punishment, such as 
killing fellow child captives trying to escape. Many are still believed to be in captivity, 
others have died in battle or from mistreatment, disease and hunger. Girls are coerced 
into sexual slavery to become the ‘wives’ of LRA commanders and subjected to rape, 
unwanted pregnancies, and sexually transmitted diseases. 
Fearing abduction, every evening about 40,000 children in northern Uganda (the ‘night 
commuters’) pour into towns where they seek sanctuary under poor conditions in 
hospitals, schools, or mission grounds; they return home in the morning. No official 
assistance is provided to these children, and they can be abused as they make the nightly 
treks between home and shelter.  
3.4  Access to education 
With the destruction of schools, looting of supplies and shortage of teachers, education 
in northern Uganda has been severely affected by conflict. Schools have been closed or 
relocated, and those still operating have been forced to limit their teaching times to 
those considered to be safe for children to attend (10 am to 3 pm). Many are not 
attending school for fear of LRA killings and abductions while others, teachers 
included, have moved to more secure districts where they add to the congestion of the 
towns. This has created shortages of shelter for teachers and students, scholastic 
materials, classrooms, drugs, water and sanitation, and recreation facilities. 
In addition, the learning and effective participation of children in the classroom is 
affected by their traumatic experiences. Moreover, universal primary education is not 
matched to the curriculum needs of traumatized or displaced children. The skills of 
teachers in particular are limited for coping with these children. Traditional support 
mechanisms have been greatly weakened and efforts at school-based counselling are  
 
Table 2 






Rates of failure in 
examinations at leaving 
primary school, % 
Dropouts in total 
district enrolment, % 
National    87  52    25.9  4.5 
Kitgum 124  71    29.3  4.8 
Pader 151  80    40.6  6.3 
Lira   84  56    32.7  5.0 
Source:  Ministry of Education and Sports (2003). 7 
easily eroded by other community factors such as lack of shelter, abuse and poverty 
(UN 2003b: 69). As Table 2 indicates, the quality of education in the affected districts is 
generally lower than the national average. For example Pader has a pupil-to-classroom 
ratio of 151, a pupil-to-teacher ratio of 80, a 41 per cent failure rate of examinations for 
leaving primary school and a 6.3 per cent dropout rate. These are much higher than the 
national averages of 87, 52, 26 and 4.5 per cent, respectively. Limited access to quality 
education denies children their basic human right, and restricts their future involvement 
in mainstream economic and social life, also compromising the overall development 
prospects of the country.  
3.5  Water and sanitation 
The forced resettlement of people into camps in an effort to protect the population has 
resulted in overcrowding and woefully inadequate basic facilities, including water and 
sanitation. Latrine coverage is estimated at over 145 persons per latrine stance as 
compared to the standard of 20 persons per stance, for emergency situations. 
Availability of water from non-rain water sources is currently at 4-12 litres per person 
per day when the emergency standard is 15 litres (UN 2003b: 42). This situation is 
particularly acute in Pader, Lira and in areas of Teso and Soroti where a growing 
number of displaced people are living in newly established camps where water and 
sanitation facilities are still being developed.  
3.6  Heath and nutrition 
Health services in the affected areas are faced with shortages of drugs, health workers, 
food supplements, medical equipment and infrastructure. Consequently, the health and 
nutrition conditions of the conflict areas are said to be very poor in comparison to the 
rest of the country. For example, BCG immunization rates in the districts of Kitgum and 
Pader fell almost by half over the period 2001-03 (Table 3) while the national average 
increased from 90 to 96 per cent. Infant mortality stands at 290 per 1,000 for Gulu, and 
274 per 1,000 births each for Kitgum and Pader.
 The national average is 88 per 1,000. In 
Kitgum and Pader in 2002 there were on average 70 and 68 health centres per one 
million people, respectively, compared to the national average of 124. 
Malnutrition is acute in the affected areas because of food insecurity, and is considered 
to be the underlying cause of death at present, although parents also report cases of 
 
Table 3 
Immunization rates against major diseases (%) 
 Year  National  Kitgum  Pader    Lira  Soroti 
Bacillus Camete Guerin (BCG)  2001  90  105  89  146  171 
  2003  96  48 48 74  120 
Measles  2001  62  95 57 82 98 
  2003  83  42 45 55 87 
Diphtheria, whooping cough & tetanus  2001  60  66  38  64  122 
  2003  81  39 27 54  101 
Source:   UBOS (2004).  8 
diarrhoea, fever and respiratory infections. For example, assessments in the IDP camps 
of Gulu and Kitgum indicate that the malnutrition rates of children under-five are 31.6 
per cent and 12.5 per cent, respectively (UN 2003b: 36). 
Although the overall prevalence of HIV in Uganda has reportedly declined substantially 
in recent years from its previous peak, this is a considerable problem for northern 
Uganda. An antenatal site (Lacor hospital) in Gulu district registered 11.9 per cent, the 
highest HIV prevalence among pregnant women in 2002, compared with 10.8 per cent 
for the western region, 8.5 per cent for the central region and 6.3 per cent for the east 
(Figure 2). Several factors are seen as causing the spread of HIV/AIDS in the north: (i) 
disruption of the cultural and social system so that children lack proper parental 
instruction; (ii) increased sexual activity due to over-crowding in camps and 
redundancies from jobs; (iii) rape, sexual abuse and exploitation of girls and young 
women; and (iv) lack of concern over health issues resulting from traumatized 
experiences (Human Rights Watch 2003). It is therefore essential to increase awareness 
among the IDPs to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDs in the camps. 
Figure 2 

































Nsambya Mbarara Lacor Tororo
 
Note:   Data on HIV prevalence are obtained from the four respective districts; Nsambya for central 
region, Mbarara for the western regions, Tororo for the eastern regions and Lacor for the north.  
Source:   Ministry of Health (2003). 
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3.7  Decline in the social and cultural structure of society 
The conflict situation has led to a breakdown of social and cultural values in northern 
Uganda. Displacement and resettlement in camps caused a degeneration in social values 
and order, resulting in such behavioural changes as neglected responsibilities, increased 
crime rates, high rates of alcohol and drug consumption, and lack of respect for 
traditional values. Separation, orphanhood and increased domestic violence have 
disrupted the family structure (UN 1999).  
3.8  Poverty and human development 
Northern Uganda lags behind the rest of the country in terms of human development. 
The insecurity of the north has led to gross human right violations, loss of productive 
assets of the poor, retarded economic activity, and restricted access to social services 
and markets. The human development index (HDI) for northern Uganda in 2001 was 
0.350, which is lower than 0.449, the national average, or 0.552 for the central district, 
for example (UNDP 2002). The region has also persistently had the highest incidence of 
poverty at an average of 66 per cent over the last ten years (Table 4). This is much 
higher than the national average of 46 per cent or that of the other districts.  
Table 4 
Regional poverty trends 1992/3-2002/03 
Region  1992/3 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7  1999/00  2002/03  Average 
National   55.5  52.2  50.1 48.5 44  35  37.7 46.1 
North  71 69 64 68 59 65 63 65.6 
East  59 58 65 58 54 37 46 53.8 
West  53 56 50 47 42 28 31 43.9 
Central  46 36 31 30 28 20 22 30.2 
Notes:   Estimates for 2002/03 exclude Kitgum, Gulu, Pader, Kasese and Bundibujo. Estimates for the 
poverty line were based on seven household surveys; the Integrated Household Survey, 
1992/93, four subsequent Monitoring Surveys (1993/4-1997/8) and the 1999/00 and 2002/03 
Uganda National Household Surveys (UBOS).  
4 Reconstruction  efforts   
Reconstruction efforts in northern Uganda include development initiatives, emergency 
relief and preparedness and peace and reconciliation. 
4.1 Development  initiatives 
In collaboration with development partners, the government of Uganda has 
implemented several programmes in the northern region. The aim has been to empower 
communities by enhancing their capacity to systematically identify, prioritize, and plan 
for their needs and to implement sustainable development initiatives through various 
projects to improve socioeconomic services and opportunities. Examples of such 
projects are the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), EU-Karamoja and 10 
EU-Acholi.4 Programme activities include: (i) institutional development to strengthen 
project management capacity, disseminate information, monitor and evaluate activities; 
(ii) capacity-building at the local government and community level, to undertake 
bottom-up planning, deliver and manage services, mobilize and organize communities 
for peacebuilding and conflict management; (iii) infrastructure development; 
(iv) vocational training for war returnees and orphans; (v) promoting time- and labour-
saving technology in IDP camps; (vi) development of micro credit schemes; and 
(vii) community counselling and training.  
The programmes have, however, only achieved limited success due to a number of 
problems: 
−  Insecurity has retarded the speed at which projects are implemented and 
monitored, by hindering access to communities, limiting contributions from 
the community, and increasing the costs of project implementation; 
−  Lack of capacity at the district- and community levels; 
−  Cross-cutting issues such as gender discrimination and environmental 
concerns exist, making it difficult to integrate women, for example, into 
programme activities;5  
−  The issue of survival has made many people focus more on the basics of daily 
life rather than on community development. This has contributed to 
inflexibility and a narrow scope in the programmes; 
−  Integration, conflict management and reconciliation as part of the 
development agenda are lacking in many communities, organizations and 
institutions, e.g. the NUSAF project; 
−  The nomad nature of the communities in Karamoja, combined with 
insecurity, makes it difficult to provide services or gather information to 
better address development needs (e.g. EU-Karamoja projects). 
4.2  Emergency relief and preparedness  
Several international and local organizations provide emergency relief and follow-up 
assistance to IDPs. These include the distribution of food and non-food items and 
support to the social sectors (education and health) in the form of essential drugs; 
support to HIV/AIDS infected persons; psychosocial, socioeconomic and nutrition 
support; provision of water and sanitation facilities; provision of temporary classrooms, 
scholastic materials, school sanitation and water supply; teacher skills training for 
psychosocial care; tracing abducted children and their reintegration into the community; 
                                                 
4  The EU-funded projects are being implemented by the Karamoja Projects Implementation Unit, which 
was established in 1995. Communities are required to contribute 25 per cent of the estimated costs of 
the projects (see RoU and EC 2001). Similarly, the community contribution in the EU-Acholi 
Programme is 25 per cent. This programme covers Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts and its projects 
work through the local government structure. 
5  Acholi communities have a predominantly patriarchal society with the men as figureheads in all 
sectors of the community.   11 
immediate care and psychosocial support through counselling; promotion of sports and 
games in schools; and peace education and community-based reconciliation.  
Emergency relief to improve the welfare of IDPs in the camps has, however, been 
insufficient due to financial constraints. For example, the WFP currently faces a funding 
gap of US$50 million in providing food relief assistance to about 1.3 million IDPs in 
northern Uganda through December 2005 (WFP 2005). Other constraints to programme 
implementation include: 
−  The insecurity, which limits regular humanitarian assistance to the affected 
areas, means that there is no sustainable health, education and other basic 
services;  
−  Although in effect since August 2004, the national policy on internal 
displacement enacted to establish the operational principles for the 
government, and humanitarian and other development agencies in providing 
assistance and protection of IDPs in Uganda is not yet implemented;  
−  Lack of capacity at relevant government departments6 for humanitarian 
affairs limits the effective coordination and facilitation of these activities as 
well as hinders the collection of relevant information concerning the affected 
population; 
−  The government recently announced its intention to have the line ministries, 
the districts and other stakeholders implement recovery efforts primarily 
through their own budget frameworks. This raises concerns over how the 
additional resources needed for the reconstruction of northern Uganda will be 
reconciled within the budgets and the overall balance (e.g. sector ceilings) of 
the national budget. 
4.3  Efforts to create peace and reconciliation 
The government of Uganda and actors from the national, regional and international 
communities have undertaken numerous initiatives towards creating peace and 
reconciliation in northern Uganda. A combination of methods has been tried, including 
disarmament, amnesty, military operations, peace negotiations, community 
mobilization, political education, and research. 
The Karamoja Disarmament Programme was initiated by the government in December 
2001. Its main objectives were to (i) enlist support of the people at the grassroots level 
for the peaceful disarmament, with sensitization programmes; (ii) end the terrorism of 
the armed Karamojong; (iii) stop illegal trafficking of guns from Sudan/Kenya and work 
closely with Kenya to ensure a concurrent disarmament of the Turkana and Didinga; 
(iv) resettle and rehabilitate those voluntarily surrendering their arms; (v) train and 
deploy security forces (UPDF and local defence units, LDUs) at strategic areas in 
Karamoja and along various border-points to stop armed incursions and gun trafficking; 
                                                 
6  The office of the prime minister is responsible for the overall coordination and monitoring of the 
implementation of the government strategies, in partnership with the ministry of finance planning and 
economic development, which has the key role for the financial aspects of the recovery. 12 
and (vi) support the police and judiciary to ensure peace and administration of justice. 
Some 11,000 guns, out of an estimated total of 40,000 held by the Karamojong warriors, 
have been relinquished to date. But the exercise has encountered difficulties:  
−  The programme, received with mixed feelings, has also generated panic 
among the pastoral communities who are reluctant to surrender weapons for 
fear of attacks from neighbouring tribes (ADOL 2000);  
−  Weak enforcement of law and order in Karamoja makes it difficult to ensure 
timely arrests and prosecution of the offenders; 
−  The small arms trafficking along the Uganda/Sudan/Kenya borders erodes 
supervision of the warriors in the region because their activities cut across 
borders into states where government is non-existent. Consequently, 
cooperation to facilitate the control of trafficking across common borders 
cannot be established officially;  
−  Government has failed to provide a timely and effective response to the 
identified requirements needed for the programmes, i.e. provision of adequate 
funds, opening up of secure roads, and construction of wells; 
−  The paucity of remunerative livelihoods for the youths voluntarily 
surrendering their weapons has triggered a reoccurrence of cattle rustling and 
conflicts;  
−  The deployed local defence units are often ill-trained and poorly supported 
because of a mismatch between the timeframe and availability of resources, 
while UPDF forces are not adequately prepared to back up these units;  
−  Lack of cooperation, trust, commitment, common cause and sincerity among 
the senior local leadership perpetuates clashes and raids between clans;  
−  The insecurity of Karamoja spills over into the neighbouring districts where 
the Karamojongs have migrated in large numbers to search for pasture and 
water. Human rights violations by the Karamojongs often lead to violent 
clashes between these and the government forces. 
To provide assurances of no retaliation and to offer incentives to all those willing to 
abandon the uprising, the government of Uganda, with support from donors, introduced 
the Amnesty Act 2000, which is overseen by the Amnesty Commission. The major 
goals of the Amnesty Act are (i) to improve public and political leadership with regard 
to conflict resolution and reconciliation; (ii) to promote dialogue and reconciliation 
among rebel groups; (iii) to demobilize and process applicants seeking amnesty; (iv) to 
provide resettlement assistance that includes psychological support and health care, and 
financial assistance to those seeking amnesty; and (v) to facilitate long-term social and 
economic integration through income-generating and skills development programmes. 
Since the enactment of the Amnesty Act in 2000, over 15,000 insurgents have 
surrendered, but only about 4,000 have received the reintegration package.  
Fulfilment of the Amnesty Act 2000 goals is challenged by delays in formulating a 
national framework for coordinating and implementing the Amnesty. Inadequate 13 
funding together with weaknesses in the Commission’s financial management and 
procurement systems have also delayed the implementation of priority activities. LRA 
fighters do not have enough information on the Amnesty offer because of the lack of 
safe zones. And ongoing investigations by the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
leading to the possible prosecution of the LRA leaders are said to have discouraged 
many potential defectors and to have instilled fear in others who have already benefited 
from amnesty.  
There have been continuous efforts at the national, regional and international level to 
broker a peace agreement between the government of Uganda and the LRA. Though 
these efforts generally failed in the early 2000s, the situation appears to be improving to 
date, and there is optimism concerning the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict.  
The chief negotiator between the government and LRA, Betty Bigombe, continues to 
maintain contact with LRA leaders. However, the negotiation process is fraught with 
difficulties, including the lack of direct face-to-face negotiations with Joseph Kony, 
limited logistical, political and diplomatic support. The number of security incidents has 
decreased over the past few months, and more LRA defectors are reporting to the 
Amnesty Commission. Regional security has improved. Uganda is actively participating 
in regional peace processes, with active diplomacy and the signing of agreements. 
Despite considerable problems in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, threats from 
this area appear to have diminished. The relations between Uganda and Sudan have also 
improved over the past year, increasing the effectiveness of UPDF’s counter-insurgency 
effort. However counter-insurgency measures by the military are criticized for adding to 
the death toll of civilians, to abductions, as well as fear and displacement. The recent 
agreement between the Sudanese government and the SPLA in the south has also 
renewed hope of peace in northern Uganda; Sudan has reduced its support to LRA. 
Success of the Sudanese peace agreement is critical for stabilizing both the southern 
Sudan and the relationship between Uganda and the Sudanese government. Civil society 
initiatives at reconciliation and bridge-building are showing promise.7 Finally, ICC 
investigations are putting pressure on both the government and LRA. Nevertheless, total 
peace remains elusive in some parts of the north, thus, human suffering continues and 
poverty is still a major challenge.  
Research carried out in the conflict areas by international and local organizations and 
individuals has been important to building peace. Field research, which included 
participatory methods, and discussions of the findings at conferences, in particular, has 
influenced donor and national policy interventions. It has been used as a vehicle for 
breaking down barriers in the community and for creating a link between the parties 
concerned—the region, central government, and local/state and international actors (see 
for example Doran 2000). However, coordination and wide dissemination of research 
results seem to be lacking. This study noted discrepancies in the findings of similar 
research studies.  
 
                                                 
7  Acholi district representatives and religious leaders have participated in the peace talks between the 
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5  Conclusions and recommendations  
The insurgency in northern Uganda has done enormous economic and social damage 
and has hindered development and relief activities. Insufficient funding and lack of 
capacity at the district and community levels are further constraints to relief efforts and 
development. Effective action requires not only a massive injection of resources, but 
also a clear strategy for peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, in two broad 
areas.  
The first is peace and reconciliation. Obviously greater effort is needed by the 
government and other stakeholders to end the conflict. This should include increasing 
resources directed towards initiatives such as the Amnesty Commission and Karamoja 
disarmament programme, and urging both sides to pursue peaceful conflict resolution 
within the framework of the United Nations and regional mechanisms. The Amnesty 
Commission needs to link up with community-based reintegration initiatives such as 
NUSAF to ensure the sustainable socioeconomic reintegration of those taking up the 
offer of amnesty. Those guilty of crimes against civilians should be brought to justice, 
including individuals within the UPDF ranks. However, concerns have been raised that 
the investigation of LRA leaders may increase the risk that children will be targeted and 
prosecuted by the LRA since children are exempted from the ICC prosecution. Ensuring 
that the path to peace negotiations is open and unobstructed by such obstacles as 
possible prosecution of the LRA leadership by the ICC is important. 
Civilians in the affected areas must be effectively protected, and government forces 
respect the rights of civilians in northern Uganda. In particular, the protection, rights 
and wellbeing of children must be integrated into the processes of peace, post-conflict 
recovery and reconstruction, with special attention to the needs and capabilities of girls. 
The LRA is obliged by international law to immediately cease cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, deliberate killing of civilians or abductees; release all abductees 
still being detained; and allow the humanitarian agencies full, safe and unhindered 
access to the affected areas.  
The disarmament programme in Karamoja needs to focus on strengthening the defence 
forces that supervise security in the region, community mobilization and sensitization at 
the grassroots, and cooperation among the regional stakeholders, the senior leadership 
and local politicians. More effective joint regional action is called for to prevent, 
combat or eradicate small arms trafficking. 
A clear strategy is also needed in the area of relief and development interventions. It is 
important to strengthen capacity, particularly in the areas of participatory and bottom-up 
planning to reflect the priority needs of the communities as well as government capacity 
to coordinate development and relief activities in the affected areas. Speeding up the 
enactment of the Disaster Management and Preparedness Bill and implementation of  
the policy on internal displacement is also crucial. Two other priorities include   
(i) harmonizing development interventions by different stakeholders (donors,   
the government, NGOs and the private sector) to achieve increased flexibility and 
transparency (ii) addressing cross-cutting issues such as gender discrimination and 
environmental concerns in the implementation of the projects. This is a tough agenda 
but given the scale and depth of poverty in Northern Uganda, it is the bare minimum. As 
with other conflict-affected countries, the objectives of peace and poverty reduction in 15 
the region must be viewed as a whole, and integrated into the cross-cutting measures 
that deal with the country’s overall development problems. 
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